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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken by Plaintiff and Appellant Branson G. Neff ("Appellant" or
"Branson") from orders and judgments of the First Judicial District Court. Thus, the
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3102(3)Q). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) ("The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction .. . over .. . orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction."). Additionally, in its
November 13, 2008 Order, the supreme court elected to retain this appeal. See
November 13, 2008 Order, on file with the Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Branson raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court
erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") with respect to the
Jury's special verdict, specifically awarding Branson his attorney fees as special damages
for his successful slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Defendant
and Appellee Marvin G. Neff ("Appellee" or "Marvin"); (2) whether, in light of the trial
court's error regarding the first issue, the trial court erred in declining to award Branson
the attorney fees expressly awarded to him by the Jury as special damages for his
successful slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Marvin; and (3)
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Branson on his
malicious prosecution cause of action against Marvin.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for each of the three issues before this Court is the same.
Specifically, the Appellate Court Utah reviews the trial court's rulings at issue in this
appeal for correctness, viewing all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to Branson, and affording the trial court no deference. See, e.g., Walker v.
Parish Chem. Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 1996) (elucidating standard of review
regarding grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict); see also, e.g., Jensen v.
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, Tf 127, 130 P.3d 325 (stating standard of review for awards of
attorney fees); Keith Jorgensen 's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, f 11,
26 P.3d 872 (same); see also, e.g., Nu-Med USA, Inc. v. 4Life Research, L.C., 2008 UT
50, Tf 5, 190 P.3d 1264 (reiterating standard of review on grant of summary judgment).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
The issues at bar were preserved below by Branson's memoranda and oral
arguments relating to the trial court's rulings and orders under review. For instance,
Branson preserved the issues on appeal by raising them in the following papers:
First and Second Issues: (1) February 9, 2007 Plaintiff Branson G. Neff s Motion
for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs; (2) February 9, 2007 Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs; (3) February 9,
2007 Affidavit of James E. Magleby in Support of Jury's Award of Attorney Fees and
Costs; (4) March 26, 2007 Reply Memorandum in Support of Branson's Motion for Entry
of Judgment of Attorney Fees and Costs; (5) March 26, 2007 Supplemental Affidavit of
James E. Magleby in Support of Jury's Award of Attorney Fees and Costs; (6) March 26,
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2007 Affidavit of Jefferson W. Gross; and (7) March 26, 2007 Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict. See R. 9796-10184, 10295-328,
10343-77, 10386-535, & 10378-85.
Third Issue: (1) September 14, 2006 Opposition to Marvin G. Neff s Motion for
Summary Judgment on Malicious Prosecution, Defamation/False Light, Invasion of
Privacy, and Slander of Title Claims; and (2) December 7, 2006 Supplemental
Memorandum Regarding Aspen Springs and Malicious Prosecution Issues. See R. 79308059 & 8618-48.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
With respect to the first and second issues - the "JNOV Ruling" and the resulting
refusal by the trial court to follow the Jury's special verdict, specifically awarding
Branson his attorney fees, respectively - the determinative rule is Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 51, which reads, in its entirety, as follows:
(a) Preliminary instructions. After the jury is sworn and before opening
statements, the court may instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and
conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the
cause of action, and the definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury
concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court
and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in
comprehending the case.
(b) Interim instructions. During the course of the trial, the court may
instruct the jury on the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in
comprehending the case. A party may request an interim instruction.
(c) Final instructions. The court shall instruct the jury at the conclusion of
the evidence as may be needed.
(d) Request for instructions. Parties shall file requested jury instructions
at the final pretrial conference or at any other time directed by the court. If

3

a party relies on a statute, rule or case to support or object to a requested
instruction, the party shall provide a citation to or a copy of the statute, rule
or case. The court shall provide the parties with a copy of the approved
instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement.
(e) Written instructions. Whenever practical, jury instructions should be
in writing. At least one written copy shall provided to the jury. The court
shall provide a written copy to any juror who requests one.
(f) Objections to instructions. Objections to written instructions shall be
made before the instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral
instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the
jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to
make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to
an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not
be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In objecting to the
giving of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to which the
objection is made and the grounds for the objection.
(g) Arguments. Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after
the court has given the jury its final instructions. The court shall not
comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact.
UtahR.Civ.P.51.
As to the third issue - the summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim the determinative rule is Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which reads, in its entirety, as
follows:
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after
the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for
summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and
a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just.

5

(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE
After years of hard-fought, contentious, and expensive litigation, Branson finally

got his day in court. Following a jury trial that spanned three weeks, the Jury found in
favor of Branson and against Marvin on, among other things, Branson's claims for
slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. The Jury was specifically and properly
instructed that Branson's attorney fees were recoverable as special damages on those two
claims. In accordance with those instructions, the Jury specifically awarded Branson his
fees in response to separate special interrogatories on exactly that issue on the Special
Verdict Form.
However, despite the copious evidence in the record supporting the Jury's verdict,
and in contravention of the law and its own instructions to the Jury, the trial court
erroneously granted Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
declined to award Branson his attorney fees. The trial court's grant of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was reversible error.
The JNOV Ruling was not the only instance of reversible error by the trial court.
Prior to trial, the trial court erroneously granted Defendants' motion for partial summary
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judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim against Marvin. The trial court
based its ruling on the incorrect conclusion that a magistrate's bind over of a criminal
defendant, standing alone, defeats a subsequent cause of action for malicious prosecution
by the former criminal defendant. In so ruling, the trial court ignored the controlling and
directly contrary authority from the Utah Supreme Court and focused incorrectly on the
wrong party for the probable-cause inquiry. Indeed, the trial court's grant of summary
judgment is directly at odds with the express and unambiguous precedent of this Court
and over 100 years of Utah precedent. See, e.g., Hodges v. Gibson, 811 P.2d 151 (Utah
1991); Johnston v. Meaghr, 14 Utah 426, 47 P. 861, 865 (1897). The trial court's ruling
is illogical and, if accepted, would effectively eliminate the tort of malicious prosecution.
Indeed, if the trial court's position were correct, then the more premeditated and robust
the defendant's false accusation, the more likely that defendant would be to escape
liability for malicious prosecution. Obviously, that is not the law, and has not been since
even before Utah was a state. See, e.g., Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224, 226
(Utah Terr. 1893).
Accordingly, Branson respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court reverse
the trial court's grant of Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
reverse the trial court's refusal to award to Branson the attorney fees specifically awarded
by the jury, reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Branson's malicious
prosecution claim, and remand to the trial court to award Branson his attorney fees and
hold a trial on the merits regarding Branson's malicious prosecution claim.
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II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Branson initiated this action on October 29, 2002, asserting claims against Marvin

for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty, slander of title, breach of contract, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See R. 16-18, 21, & 26-27. Later,
Branson amended his complaint to add causes of action against Marvin for battery and
malicious prosecution. See R. 3723-24.
Marvin asserted counterclaims against Branson for, among other things, breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, battery, breach of
fiduciary duty, and slander of title. See R. 1609-11 & 1615-17. Other parties and claims,
which are not relevant to the issues before the Court, were dismissed.
Before trial, the trial court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment
on Branson's malicious prosecution claim against Marvin. See R. 8721-22.
The parties' remaining claims were tried before a jury. See R. 9788-94. On
February 5, 2007, the Jury in this matter completed its Special Verdict Form and gave
judgment in favor of Branson on all of Branson's claims against Marvin. See R. 9788-91.
Also, the Jury found in favor of Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of title
counterclaim. See R. 9793. The Jury gave judgment in favor of Marvin on his remaining
counterclaims against Branson, but awarded him a total of $2.00. See R. 9792-94.
With regard to Branson's slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the
Jury expressly found under both claims "that Marvin should be held to pay Branson's
attorney fees." R. 9789-91. The trial court specifically and expressly instructed the Jury
that if the Jury awarded attorney fees, the judge would determine and award the amount
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of those fees. See R. 9771 & 9777. In other words, the amount of Branson's fees was
not submitted to the Jury.
In contrast to its award of attorney fees to Branson, the Jury expressly declined to
award Marvin attorney fees. See R. 9792-94. In fact, the Jury declined to award Marvin
anything more than $2.00, expressly found that Branson did not slander title to Marvin's
property, and expressly found that even though Branson had breached his fiduciary duty
to Marvin, Branson should not be held to pay Marvin's attorney fees. See id.
On June 19, 2007, the trial court granted Marvin's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. SeeR. 10569.
On July 25, 2008, the trial court entered the final order. See R. 11353. This
appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
L

MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING BRANSON'S FIRST AND SECOND
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A,

The Jury Instructions

At trial, both Branson and Marvin submitted to the Jury causes of action for
slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. See R. 9789-91 & 9793-94. The jury
instructions accurately reflected the law and elements for those claims. See R. 9767 &
9776-77. To wit, agreement of and without objection from the parties, the following
instruction was given to the Jury as to both brothers' fiduciary duty claims:
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INSTRUCTION NO,

3 g

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DAMAGES
If either party prevails on his ctaim for breach of fiduciary dirty, he may be
awarded damages for those losses and injuries proximately caused from the other
party's breach, including his attorneys fees incurred.
If you choose to award attorney fees as damages herein, the amount of
attorney's fees will be determined later by the court.

R.9771.
Notably, both parties agreed to the instruction that attorney fees could be awarded
as damages, but that the amount of such an award would be determined by the trial court.
See id.
Further, by agreement of and without objection from the parties, the following
instruction was given to the Jury as to both brothers' slander of title claims:

INSTRUCTION NO,

£

IT

SLANDER OF TITLE
In order to recover for slander of title, a party must prove that:
(1) The other published a slanderous statement disparaging his title to his
property;
(2}The statement was false;
(3} The statement was made with malice;

j

{4} The statement proximately caosi? anjfactual or specific damage.
{5} A scandalous statement was published, or recorded, or notcuredA
disparaging the other's title.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

3

?

SUNDER OF TITLE
DEFINITION - ACTUAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGES
In order to prevail on his slander of title claim, the party must prove that he
suffered actual or special damages. This requires that the party establish that he has
Incurred pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated, Usually, this involves
demonstrating a safe of the property ^ a reduced price or at greater expense to the
seller. It is not sufficient, however, for the party to show ttiat f i e land's value has
dropped on the market, as such woufd not constitute a realized or liquidated loss to the
party • Attomey fees may be recoverable as special damages If Incurred to clear title,
or to undo any harm created by whatever slander of title actually occurred.

R. 9776-77.
Again, it is noteworthy that both parties agreed to the instruction that attorney fees
could be awarded as damages, but that the amount of such an award would be determined
by the trial court. See id.
B.

The Jury's Verdict

In the Special Verdict Form, the Jury found for Branson and against Marvin on
Branson's slander of title claim, and specifically awarded Branson his attorney fees. See
R. 9789-90. Also, the Jury found for Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of
title claim, and thus, did not award Marvin any damages or attorney fees. See R. 9793.
The Jury found for Branson and against Marvin on Branson's breach of fiduciary duty
claim, and specifically awarded Branson his attorney fees. SeeR.9790-91. Again, the
Jury expressly declined to award Marvin any damages or attorney fees for his breach of
fiduciary duty claim. See R. 9793-94. As declared by the Jury's Foreperson:
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a.

"The Jury specifically and intentionally awarded Branson his

attorney fees as part of his damages." R. 10556.
b.

"The Jury believed it was making Branson whole by awarding him

his attorney fees." id.
c.

"The [trial court] instructed the Jury not to calculate Branson's

attorney fees because the [trial court] would calculate them after our verdict." R.
10557.
d.

"The Jury specifically and intentionally declined to award Marvin

any attorney fees because Marvin lost and we did not think Marvin was entitled to
his attorney fees as damages." Id.
e.

"In the end, Branson was the winner of the Trial. This was why we

awarded Branson . . . his attorney fees as damages for the slander of title and
breach of fiduciary duty claims." R. 10557-58.
Despite the Jury's verdict, the trial court granted Marvin's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, concluding "as a matter of law that the jury failed to follow
the [trial court]'s instructions, regarding the Special Verdict and instructions 6C and 8C."
R. 10566.
C.

The Evidence Adduced at Trial Regarding Damages Suffered by
Branson Relating to His Slander of Title and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claims

At trial, the following evidence was admitted, which supported the Jury's award of
attorney fees to Branson on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims:
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Formation of the Partnership

In or about 1962, Branson and his father started a construction company called
B.B. Neff & Sons. See R. 11485 at 6. At that time, Branson's brother, Marvin, was
approximately 11 years old. See id. at 11.
In or about 1967, Branson acquired a farm in Corrine, Utah (the "Farm"). See R.
11485 at 6-14. Branson used the Farm as collateral for construction bonding, a necessity
for licensure. See id. at 23-25.
In or about 1970, Branson invited Marvin to join him in the construction business.
See id. at 18-19. However, Marvin did not become partners with Branson until in or
about 1975, when they started ABCO Construction, Inc. ("ABCO"). See id. at 19.
Branson contributed machinery, equipment, and use of the Farm for bonding. See id. at
22-23. The brothers had a 'handshake deal' with respect to ABCO until 1982, when they
signed a partnership agreement. See id. at 20-21; R. 11488 at 582-83.
In or about 1983, Branson gave Marvin approximately one acre from the Farm on
which to build a home. See R. 11485 at 28-30. Branson also built his home on a
different one-acre portion of the Farm. See id. at 30 & 33.
2.

The Asset-Protection Work

In or about 1998, Branson and Marvin hired an attorney, Travis Bowen
("Bowen"), to perform some asset-protection work. See id. at 60-61; R. 11487 at 406.
3.

The Buyout

Shortly after the asset-protection work was completed, Branson began to discover
Marvin's breaches of fiduciary duty. See R. 11486 at 63-64. Among other things,
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Marvin embezzled money from ABCO and refused Branson access to ABCO's books
and records. See id. at 136-37, 142, & 166. As a result of those discoveries, Branson
realized the need to disassociate with Marvin. See id.
In or about April 1999, Branson again hired Bowen to organize a new company
called Big Sky Contracting ("Big Sky"). See id. at 63-64. Branson is the sole owner of
Big Sky. See id. at 66.
In the latter part of 1999, Branson and Marvin began discussions regarding Marvin
buying out Branson's interest in ABCO. See id. at 67. Branson and Marvin again hired
Bowen to assist with the buyout. See id. at 69; R. 11487 at 413.
Marvin and Branson could not agree on the value of ABCO for the purposes of the
buyout. See R. 11486 at 69-70. As an outline for the buyout, Branson and Marvin signed
a one-page document titled "Property Settlement," on or about December 8, 1999. See
id. at 88-90 & 100-01.
(a)

The Farm and Branson's Home

As part of the buyout agreement, Branson and Marvin agreed that Branson would
keep the Farm, on which stood Branson's home, which Branson built himself. See id. at
83, 94, & 149-51.
To facilitate the buyout process, Bowen created partnerships for assets to pass into
for subsequent distribution. See id. at 122-23 & 148; R. 11487 at 435-36, 438, & 456-62.
Branson signed the deeds necessary to transfer title to the Farm to one of these passthrough partnerships, after being assured that the deeds would not be recorded until the
remaining buyout documents were completed. See R. 11486 at 148-50; R. 11487 at 443
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& 445-46. However, in contravention of that plan, and without Branson or Bowen's
permission, Marvin took the Farm deeds from Bowen's office and personally recorded
them such that Branson had no record ownership in the Farm, or even in his own home.
SeeR. 11486 at 163-64.
During more than four years of contentious and expensive litigation, Marvin
refused to return title to the Farm to Branson, despite the parties' agreement, Bowen's
instructions, and Branson's pleading. See id at 113, 148-50, 174-75, 177, 182-83, 185,
192-94, & 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64, & 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 83942. For instance, Marvin refused to respond to the following letter from Branson:
While I was in the hospital, I kept thinking that it should be you who
was administering blessings, it should have been you my wife could call in
an emergency. You are my only brother and closest family. When our pipe
broke, it should have been you that we called and paid your restoration
company to come and fix the mess. Our situation is the pits. Life is too
short.
When I came near to cashing it in and it came too close, my dear
wife would have been left with nothing. Because of the deeds, she has
nothing for collateral nothing to refinance or sell. It is the pits.
If you were to cash it in, Alice would be left with ABCO assets,
Steelwater assets, Aspen Springs and personal property gathered up by you
two over the years. Quite a difference. It's the pits.
Reading all the letters from Evelyn's situation, our family does not
need another mess. Life is too short. We need our house and farm. Go on
a mission? Nothing to finance it with. Life is too short.
To phrase an old quote, my get-up-and-go has got up and went. My
life — life is too short and getting shorter. We would appreciate your
putting the deeds back in our name. My wife does not need this kind of
stress. At her age, she should be quilting and enjoying grandchildren, not
still working to make certain we have a future.
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R. 11486 at 192-94 (emphases added). Marvin refused even to respond to Branson's
inquiries regarding the deeds, or send Branson tax notices on the Farm so that Branson
could pay property taxes. See id. at 158, 167, 175, 183, & 186-87. In fact, in March
2000, Marvin physically assaulted Branson, when Branson confronted Marvin about is
refusal to honor the buyout. See id. at 126-28.
As another example, Marvin refused to return Branson's Farm and home to
Branson, despite Bowen's warning to Marvin that his conduct may be criminal. See R.
11487 at 472.
Marvin also refused to transfer the Farm's attendant water rights to Branson. See
R. 11486 at 195-98.
The Jury found Marvin's excuses for slandering title to Branson's real property
not credible. See R. 9789-90. Those excuses included claims that Bowen's office had
forged his signature on an ineffective deed, that it was pure coincidence that Marvin
removed his slander of title the same day Branson removed a lis pendens related to this
action, that Marvin's conduct was a simple mistake, and the claim that Branson
threatened him to prevent Marvin from correcting the slander. See R. 11489 at 844, 852,
854-56, 858-59, 862-63, & 996-97.
As a result of Marvin's refusal to transfer title to the Farm back to him, Branson
incurred damages. See R. 11486 at 177-78; R. 11489 at 947-53 & 957-63. For instance,
Branson was unable to use the Farm for collateral to start his own construction company.
See R. 11486 at 177-78. Furthermore, Branson incurred attorney fees and costs to have
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title to the Farm restored, which occurred during the pendency of this action. See R.
9796-10184, 10343-77, 10386-535, 10378-85, & 11486 at 207-08.
(b)

Continued Work

Branson and Marvin's buyout agreement also included a provision whereby
Branson would continue to work as desired for ABCO for payment. See R. 11486 at 8586, & 100; R. 11488 at 568-69. However, Marvin refused to allow Branson to work for
ABCO. See R. 11486 at 136-38. Moreover, Marvin obtained a protective order against
Branson on false pretenses, so that Branson could not work for ABCO. See id. at 136-38.
(c)

Health Insurance

Additionally, Branson and Marvin agreed that Branson would be provided health
insurance through ABCO until he was 65 years old - when Medicare would take over.
See id. at 85 & 91; R. 11487 at 432. Health insurance was of critical importance to
Branson because he had diabetes and heart problems and was uninsurable. See R. 11486
at 85-91; R. 11487 at 432; R. 11488 at 524-31.
When Branson was 63 years old and in the hospital Marvin attempted to cancel
Branson's insurance. See R. 11486 at 169-70 & 179-80. Moreover, because Marvin had
refused to pay Branson the monies owed to him under the buyout agreement, Branson
lacked the funds to pay for health insurance on his own. See id. at 170. Branson was
understandably scared and went without medical insurance for six months. See id. at 171
&319;R. 11488 at 567.
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(d)

Life Insurance Policy

Branson and Marvin agreed that Marvin would purchase Branson's life insurance
policy and pay Branson the cash value of the same. See R. 11486 at 99. Branson
transferred the policy, but Marvin refused to pay Branson for nearly two years and not
until Branson filed this lawsuit. See id. at 99-100, 131-34, 140, 187-89, & 208; R. 11488
at 567-68. When Branson confronted Marvin about Marvin's failure to pay the monies
owed to Branson, Marvin called the police, falsely claiming Branson had hit him. See R.
11486 at 136-138.
(e)

Equipment and Tools

Also part of the buyout agreement, Branson and Marvin agreed that Branson could
use ABCO tools for, among other things, Big Sky. See id. at 73-74 & 92-93. However,
Marvin refused to honor that provision as well and thereby prevented Branson from
conducting other work. See id. at 152-54, 155-57, 164, & 172-74. Some of the ABCO
tools were those that Branson personally contributed when he founded ABCO. See id. at
157-58.
When Marvin finally delivered some, but not all of the tools to Branson, they were
in substantially worse condition then when the parties signed the one-page buyout
agreement, despite Marvin's agreement to maintain the same. See id. at 210-15; R.
11487 at 315.
(f)

Improper Deductions

Rather than pay Branson under the terms of the buyout agreement, Marvin
deducted not-agreed-to sums from what he owed Branson. For instance, Marvin reduced
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Branson's payment by $525, for purportedly cleaning Branson's desk; however, Branson
had taken already his desk with him. See R. 11486 at 200-03.
(g)

Marvin Forced Branson to File a Lawsuit

Marvin rebuffed Branson's attempts to resolve their dispute without court action.
See id. at 138-39, 144-47, 152-55, 158-68, 171, & 192-93. In response, Marvin not only
refused to even attempt to resolve the disputes, he also impugned Branson's character at
their shared church by stating falsehoods, such as by telling others that Branson beat his
wife and that Branson was a liar. See id. at 143 & 168.
(h)

Branson's Damages

Marvin's breaches of fiduciary duty damaged Branson by, among other things,
causing him to incur attorney fees and costs to remedy those breaches. See R. 979610184, 10343-77, 10386-535, & 10378-85; R. 11486 at 237-39, 250-52, 274, & 281-84;
R. 11487 at 289-92, 296, 301-302, & 317-19.
II.

MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING BRANSON'S THIRD ISSUE ON
APPEAL
A.

Branson Vis-a-Vis Marvin

Branson is thirteen years senior to his brother Marvin. See R. 7942; R. 11485 at 5.
At the relevant time, Branson was in his late sixties and in poor health, including
suffering from diabetes. R. 7120, 7123, & 7942. Marvin is in good health, and for
example, would regularly jog in front of the brothers' homes in Corinne, Utah. See R.
7942.
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B.

Marvin's Assault on Branson on January 26, 2005

On January 26, 2005, at about 10:00 p.m., Branson was driving home from a class
in Salt Lake City, and drove past Marvin's house to see if a new neighbor had moved into
a mobile home located on property at the end of the street. See R. 3709, 7943, & 11489.
Branson turned around and began driving back to his house. See R. 3209, 7943, &
11489. Branson saw someone standing in the road, and so slowed down. See R. 3709,
7124, 7944, & 11490. When Branson saw that it was Marvin, Branson began to speed
up, to drive past and away from Marvin. See R. 3709, 7124, & 7944. Marvin then
waived for Branson to stop. Branson stopped and backed up, and asked Marvin "What
do you need?" because Branson was concerned that there was some sort of emergency,
and that was why Marvin was waving him down. See id.
Marvin approached the car and began arguing with Branson, accusing him of
various misdeeds. See id. While Branson was sitting in his truck, seat belted in, Marvin
twice hit Branson with his fist - once in the ear and once in the shoulder - and tried to hit
Branson a third time. See id. Branson stepped on the accelerator to escape Marvin's
assault. See id.
As Branson began to accelerate away, Marvin latched on to the truck's steering
wheel, trying to pull the truck over. See id. Then, Marvin said "Branson, stop, you're
going to kill me." See id. Branson stopped the truck and Marvin let go of the unlatched
himself from the truck. See id.
After turning around to make sure Marvin was not injured and seeing Marvin up
and walking, Branson then continued into his own driveway. See id. When Branson
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entered his house, his ear was split and bleeding down the side of his face and shoulder.
See id.
C.

Neighbor Maurice Carter Witnesses the January 26, 2005 Incident and
Marvin's Manufacture of Evidence

Unbeknownst to Marvin at the time, a mutual neighbor of the brothers, Maurice
Carter ("Carter"), was watching through his window. See R. 7945 & 11490. Carter has
been a resident of Corinne for over 40 years. His home is situated between the homes of
Branson and Marvin, but on the opposite side of the road. See R. 7945 & 11489.
Carter has known Branson, Marvin, and their families the entire time they have
lived in Corinne. See id. In addition, Carter attends the same ward, and has seen the
brothers over the years at neighborhood, social, and religious functions. See id.
On the night of January 26, 2005, Carter noticed that Branson's truck was behind
him, coming up the road south of Marvin's house. See id. From his driveway, Carter
saw Branson's truck stop, and saw Marvin approach Branson's truck and Marvin start
talking to Branson. See id. Carter could see the headlights of the truck, and Marvin was
standing next to the truck on the driver's side, talking to Branson. See id.
Carter figured everything was all right and went into the house. See R. 7946 &
11489. A short time later, Carter was alerted by his wife that Branson had "taken off up
the road. See id. Carter went to his bedroom window, which looks out directly on the
road running in front of his house and the brothers' houses. See R. 7946 & 11490.
When Carter observed Marvin walking down the road, Marvin did not appear
injured, and was not limping. See id. Marvin then laid face down prone in the road near
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Carter's mailbox, got up, walked a short distance, then again laid face down prone in the
road. See id. Marvin then got up walked to the side of the road and shuffled around in
the gravel, and then walked quickly back to his house. See id. Again, Marvin did not
appear injured and was not limping. See id.
A short time later, a highway patrol car entered Branson's driveway. See id. The
following day, Marvin pretended to be injured. See id. Based on Marvin's statements to
the Sheriff, Branson was charged with, among other crimes, aggravated assault and threat
against life or property. See R. 7151-58.
Marvin's purpose in initiating these criminal proceedings was to injure Branson by
besmirching Branson's reputation and undermining his credibility in the underlying civil
proceedings in this case. See R. 3709-11.
D.

Marvin's Attempt to Tamper With a Witness in a Criminal Proceeding
By a Telephone Call to Carter on November 6, 2005

On the evening of November 6, 2005, Carter received a telephone call from
Marvin. See R. 7949 & 11491. Marvin asked if Carter was going to be at the hearing on
Branson's protective order, scheduled for the next day, November 7, 2005. See id. At
first, "Marvin tried to convince [Carter] not to go to the hearing, telling [him] that it was
not important that [he] go, and [he] should just stay out of i t " Id. "[Carter] told Marvin
[he] was going to go because [he] had been asked to go by Branson's attorneys." Id. "At
that point, Marvin became agitated and made threatening statements towards [Carter].
[Carter] did not appreciate these statements, and it was clear to [him] that Marvin was
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trying to intimidate [him] into not going to Branson's hearing." R. 7949 & 11492
(emphases added).
E.

Marvin's Verbal Assault Upon the Witnesses at the Court Hearing of
November 7, 2005

At the conclusion of a hearing held on November 8, 2005, Marvin confronted a
group of community members who had appeared at a hearing, related to the claims
Marvin had filed against Branson over the January 26, 2005 incident. See id.
After the hearing, as Carter was leaving the courthouse, he saw Marvin talking
loudly to a group of the community members who had appeared at the hearing to support
Branson. See R. 7950 & 11492. When Carter approached the group, "Marvin was highly
agitated and calling them traitors." Id.
F.

The Prosecutor's Voluntary Dismissal of the Assault Charge Against
Branson

At her own initiative, the prosecutor dismissed the charges relating to the January
26, 2005 incident. See R. 7151-58.
Despite the above-listed evidence in the record, the trial court granted summary
judgment against Branson on his malicious prosecution claim, ruling that "the finding of
probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal proceeding is dispositive,"
and, by construing the facts against Branson, ruling that "the malice element" was not
sufficiently supported by evidence. R. 8721-22. Paradoxically, however, the trial court
often cited to the ill will between the brothers to justify its rulings. See R. 11351-52.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted Marvin's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, as a result, declined to award Branson the
attorney fees awarded to him by the Jury. The trial court also committed reversible error
when it granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on Branson's malicious
prosecution claim.
With respect to the first and second issues on appeal, the trial court erred in
granting Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for at least three
reasons. First, the Jury specifically, expressly, and properly awarded Branson his
attorney fees as special damages for his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty
claims. Second, Marvin wholly failed to satisfy his requirement to marshal the evidence
supporting the Jury's verdict. Third, evidence in the record amply supported the Jury's
verdict. The trial court put the cart before the ox by ruling that Branson suffered no
damages before accounting for the special damages awarded by the Jury. A trial court
would not second-guess such a jury finding if the category of damages were something
like "lost profits"; the fact that the measure of damages has the name "attorney fees" does
not alter the analysis.
On the third and final issue on appeal, the trial court erred in granting Marvin's
motion for summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim because the
trial court misconstrued applicable law, and because numerous disputed issues of material
fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.
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Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's grant of
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reverse the trial court's
rejection of the Jury's express award to Branson of his attorney fees as special damages
(which rejection was premised upon the JNOV Ruling), reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim, and remand to the trial
court to award Branson his attorney fees and hold a trial on the merits regarding
Branson's malicious prosecution claim.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED MARVIN'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
A.

The Trial Court's Ruling on Marvin's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict

The trial court granted Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on the basis that "as a matter of law that the jury failed to follow the [trial court]'s
instructions, regarding the Special Verdict and instructions 6C and 8C." R. 10566. In so
ruling, the trial court improperly interpreted the Jury's verdict contrary to the clearly
expressed intent of the Jury as denoted by the Jury on the Special Verdict Form. That
ruling by the trial court was reversible error.
B.

Standard

An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for correctness, viewing all facts and inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and affording the trial court
no deference. See, e.g., Walker v. Parish Chem. Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 1996).
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This Court must reverse the trial court's grant of Marvin's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict unless, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to Branson, the Court concludes that there is "no competent
evidence which would support" the Jury's verdicts in favor of Branson. See DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated:
A directed verdict and a judgment n.o.v. are justified only if, after
looking at the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, "the trial court concludes that there is no
competent evidence which would support a verdict in his favor."
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982); Hansen v. Stewart,
761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988); Mel Hardman Prods., Inc. v. Robinson, 604
P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979); Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah
1979); McCloudv. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). A motion
should be denied '"H)f reasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions on the issue in controversy.'" Kilpack, 604 P.2d at 463
(quoting McCloud, 569 P.2d at 1127); Management Comm. of Graystone
Pine Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98
(Utah 1982).
Id. (alteration in original) (emphases added). Under that standard, this Court should
reverse the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Marvin's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict

The Jury specifically and expressly awarded Branson his attorney fees not once,
but twice, under the following two, independent causes of action: (1) slander of title and
(2) breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court erred by declining to follow the Jury's
verdict awarding Branson his attorney fees, for at least the following three reasons.
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1.

The Law and Jury Instructions Support the Jury's Verdict

The law and instructions given to the Jury support the Jury's verdict awarding
attorney fees to Branson on his successful slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty
claims against Marvin. In fact, the parties were in agreement as to the applicable law and
the form of the jury instructions. To recap, however, a discussion follows.
It is well settled that a party may recover, as special damages, their attorney fees
and costs incurred curing a slander of title. See Bass v. Planned Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 761
P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1998) ("Attorney fees have been held to be recoverable as special
damages if incurred to remove a cloud placed by the defendant on the title."); Dowse v.
Doris Trust Co., 116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956, 959 (1949) ('The action of slander of title
is based on a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff would not have had to incur any
expense, either for costs or for attorney's fees."). Thus, as a matter of law, Branson's
attorney fees were a proper measure of recoverable special damages for his successful
slander of title claim against Marvin. In other words, the fees were the actual damages
awarded to Branson, unlike, for example, attorney fees awarded by a trial court on the
judge's determination of prevailing party status.
In accordance with the rule of law stated above, the Jury in this case was
instructed, without any objection, that attorney fees were special damages of a slander of
title action, and that the trial court, not the Jury, would determine the amount of
Branson's attorney fees. R. 9771 ("If you chose to award attorney's fees as damages
herein, the amount of the attorney's fees will be determined later by the court." (emphasis
added)) & 9777 ("Attorney fees may be recoverable as special damages
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"). Thus, the

Jury was properly instructed on the law that permits attorney fees as special damages on a
slander of title claim. The fact that the measure of damages is called "attorney fees"
rather than "lost profits" or "unjust enrichment," for example, does not render the Jury's
verdict vulnerable.
It is also well established that a party may recover his attorney fees as special
damages on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 2001 UT 89, f 122, 65 P.3d 1134 ("[BJreach of a fiduciary obligation is a wellestablished exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases
generally."), revfdon other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Staffing Am., Inc. v. Advanced
Mgmt. Concepts, Inc., 2005 UT App 437, 2005 WL 2600637, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. Oct.
14, 2005) {^'Campbell broadly approved the awarding of attorney fees as damages for the
breach of a fiduciary duty . . . . " ) . Thus, as a matter of law, Branson was entitled to his
attorney fees as special damages on his successful breach of fiduciary duty claim.
As with Branson's slander of title claim, the trial court properly instructed the
Jury, without objection from Marvin, that the trial court, not the Jury, would determine
the amount of Branson's attorney fees. R. 9771 ("If either party prevails on his claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, he may be awarded damages for those losses . . . including his
attorney's fees incurred

If you chose to award attorney's fees as damages herein,

the amount of the attorney's fees will be determined later by the court." (emphases
added)). Thus, the Jury was properly instructed on the law that permits attorney fees as
special damages on a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
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The trial court erred by failing to follow the Jury's verdict, which was supported
by law and the jury instructions.
2.

Marvin Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting the Jury's
Verdict

The Utah Supreme Court should summarily reverse the trial court's grant of
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Marvin failed to
satisfy the requirements of such a motion. Specifically, although Utah law required
Marvin to "marshal all evidence that supports the verdict," Marvin wholly failed to do so.
DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added) (affirming
jury verdict and denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a matter of
law because moving party failed to marshal all evidence supporting the verdict); see also
Holmstrom v. CR. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, f 29, 8 P.3d 282 (requiring moving
party to "marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that the evidence
cannot support the verdict" (emphases added) (additional quotations and citations
omitted)). SeeR. 10225.
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was similar to that of
the moving party in DeBry, whose motion was denied. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1359.
Like the moving party in DeBry, Marvin referred only to the evidence that supported his
argument, rather than calling the trial court's attention to all of the relevant evidence. See
id. R. 10224-25. Also, in his papers, Marvin reargued the evidence as if his motion was
a trial de novo, which it was not because the Jury had already made the determination that
Branson was entitled to his attorney fees. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1360.
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However, unlike the moving party in DeBry, Marvin did not even attempt or
purport to marshal the evidence supporting the Jury's verdict. See id. Thus, the Court
can and should reverse the trial court's grant of Marvin's motion on that basis alone. See
Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When
the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid."). Otherwise, the marshalling
rule is meaningless, and Marvin will be rewarded for not following the rules.
3.

The Evidence and Inferences Drawn Therefrom Support the Jury's
Verdict

The evidence admitted at the trial amply supports the Jury's finding that Branson
incurred attorney fees as special damages for his successful slander of title and breach of
fiduciary duty claims.
Branson and Marvin were partners in ABCO. See R. 11485 at 19. Branson owned
and lived on the Farm, but gave Marvin a one-acre parcel on which to build his home.
See id. at 22-23, 28-30, & 33.
In or about 1999, Branson began to discover Marvin's breaches of fiduciary duty.
See R. 11486 at 63-64. Among other things, Marvin embezzled money from ABCO and
refused Branson access to ABCO's books and records. See id. at 136-37, 142, & 166.
As a result of those discoveries, Branson realized the need to disassociate with Marvin.
On December 8, 1999, Branson and Marvin executed a one-page document to
facilitate Marvin's purchase of Branson's interest in ABCO. See id. at 67 & 69; R. 11487
at 413. Marvin and Branson could not agree on the value of ABCO for the purposes of
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the buyout. See R. 11486 at 69-70. As part of the one-page buyout agreement, Branson
and Marvin agreed that Branson would keep the Farm, on which stood Branson's home,
which Branson built himself, along with water rights associated with the Farm. See id. at
83, 94, & 149-51. However, Marvin purposefully and maliciously divested Branson of
record title in the Farm and his home. See id. at 163-64. Moreover, during more than
four years of contentious and expensive litigation, Marvin refused to transfer title to the
Farm or water rights to Branson. See id. at 113, 148-50, 174-75, 177, 182-83, 185, 19398, & 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64, & 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 839-42.
Also in contravention f their agreement, Marvin refused to allow Branson to work
for ABCO. See id. at 136-38. Moreover, Marvin obtained a protective order against
Branson on false pretenses, so that Branson could not work for ABCO. See id. at 136-38.
When Branson was 63 years old and in the hospital Marvin attempted to cancel
Branson's insurance. See R. 11486 at 169-70, & 179-80. Moreover, because Marvin had
refused to pay Branson the monies owed to him under the buyout agreement, Branson
lacked the funds to pay for health insurance on his own. See id. at 170. Health insurance
was of critical importance to Branson because he had diabetes and heart problems and
was uninsurable. See R. 11486 at 85-91; R. 11487 at 432; R. 11488 at 524-31. Branson
was understandably scared and went without medical insurance for six months. See id. at
171; R. 11487 at 319; R. 11488 at 567.
Additionally, Marvin refused to pay Branson for a life insurance policy that
Branson transferred to Marvin as part of the buyout agreement for nearly two years and
not until Branson filed this lawsuit. See id. at 99-100, 131-34, 140, 187-89, & 208; R.
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11488 at 567-68. When Branson confronted Marvin about Marvin's failure to pay the
monies owed to Branson, Marvin called the police falsely claiming Branson had hit him.
SeeR. 11487 at 136-138.
Also, Marvin refused to honor a buyout provision that allowed Branson to use
ABCO tools and thereby prevented Branson from conducting other work. See id. at 15254, 155-57, 164, & 172-74. Some of the ABCO tools were those that Branson personally
contributed when he founded ABCO. See id. at 157-58. When Marvin finally delivered
some, but not all of the tools to Branson, they were in substantially worse condition than
when the parties signed the buyout agreement, despite Marvin's agreement to maintain
the same. See id at 210-15; R. 11487 at 315.
Rather than pay Branson under the terms of the buyout agreement, Marvin
deducted not-agreed-to sums from what he owed Branson. For instance, Marvin reduced
Branson's payment by $525, for purportedly cleaning Branson's desk; however, Branson
had taken already his desk with him. See R. 11486 at 200-03.
Testimonial and documentary evidence admitted during the trial revealed that
Branson incurred attorney fees and costs to cure Marvin's slander of title. For example,
the evidence demonstrated that Marvin's slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty
damaged Branson by, among other things, causing him to incur attorney fees to remedy
Marvin's misdeeds. See R. 9796-10184, 10343-77, 10386-535, & 10378-85; R. 11486 at
237-39, 250-52, 274, & 281-84; R. 11487 at 289-92, 296, 301-302, & 317-19.
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n.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED BRANSON'S REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY FEES
A.

The Trial Court's Ruling on Branson's Request for Attorney Fees

The trial court denied Brandon's request for attorney fees based on its grant of
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See R. 10569. Because the
trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was error (as discussed above
in Section I), so too was its denial of Branson's request for attorney fees.1
B.

Standard

An appellate court reviews a trial court's denial to award attorney fees premised
upon judgment notwithstanding the verdict for correctness, viewing all facts and
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and
affording the trial court no deference. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^f 127,
130 P.3d 325; Walker v. Parish Chem. Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 1996); Keith
Jorgensen 's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128,111, 26 P.3d 872.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Branson's Request for Attorney
Fees

The Jury found in favor of Branson on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary
duty claims against Marvin and awarded Branson his attorney fees as special damages.
See R. 9789-91 & 10556-58. It was Branson's constitutional right to have the Jury
decide that issue. See Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, f 53, 103 P.3d 135 (concluding that

1

Additionally, the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to enter sufficiently detailedfindingsof fact
and conclusions of law in support of its refusal to honor the Jury's verdict awarding Branson his attorney fees. See,
e.g., Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) (reiterating rule that ruling on amount of attorney fees
"must be based on the evidence and supported byfindingsof fact" (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d
266,268 (Utah 1992)); Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, % 9, 984 P.2d 392 (same).
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it is "clear that the constitutional right to a jury trial fully included the jury's
determination of damages"). If this Court reverses the trial court's grant of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (which it should), then Branson is entitled to his attorney fees
and costs.
The trial court appears to have improperly conducted a prevailing party analysis.
That analysis was inappropriate because the Jury specifically awarded Branson his
attorney fees as damages. See id. Damages are a question of fact for the Jury. Seey e.g.,
id. at \ 34 (noting that "damages are a question of fact, and . . . questions of fact are
distinctly within the jury's province"); Sohm v. Dixie Eye Ctr., 2007 UT App 235, ^f 22,
166 P.3d 614 (reversing trial court and concluding that "issues regarding damages present
questions of fact, which should be resolved by a jury"). "This is a long-standing
principle in Utah case law." Sohm, 2007 UT App 235 at f 18.
The Jury's damages award cannot be set aside absent extraordinary circumstances
- a finding that "no competent evidence exists which would support" the Jury's verdicts
in favor of Branson. DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994)
(emphasis added). As detailed above, the Jury's verdict was plenteously supported by
competent evidence. In other words, Branson has a constitutional right to the Jury's
award of his fees as damages. See Judd, 2004 UT 91 at \ 53.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED MARVIN'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BRANSON'S MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION CLAIM
A,

The Trial Court's Ruling on Branson's Malicious Prosecution Claim

The trial court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on
Branson's malicious prosecution claim on the following two bases: (1) "the finding of
probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal proceeding is dispositive/'
and (2) "the malice element" was not sufficiently supported by evidence. See R. 872122. The trial court's ruling is contrary to established Utah law and the evidence in the
record.
B.

Standard

Summary judgment is not appropriate unless "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgment procedure is generally considered a drastic
remedy, requiring strict compliance with [Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56]." Timm v.
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). For this reason, a court must accept "all
facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002
UT 42, f 20, 48 P.3d 941 (emphasis added); Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass *n v.
Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414,120, 40 P.3d 1148 (same). Moreover, "the court
does not judge the credibility of the claims or the witnesses or the weight of the
evidence." Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 429 (Utah 1990); see also Trujillo v. Utah
Dept. of Trans., 1999 UT App 227,142, 986 P.2d 752 ("Trial courts must avoid
weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on motions for summary
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judgment."). "A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact." Webster
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); see also Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210,
1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("One sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact]
is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment."
(alteration in original)).
In sum, these rules create a substantial burden on litigants because summary
judgment prevents parties from fully presenting their case to the court, and so courts are,
and should be, reluctant to invoke this drastic remedy. See Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d
620, 623 (Utah 1974) ("Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and the courts should be
reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a
trial.").
C.

The Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment on Branson's
Malicious Prosecution Claim Was Error
1.

Elements of Malicious Prosecution

The definitive Utah case on the elements of malicious prosecution is Hodges v.
Gibson, 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court defined the four
elements of the tort of malicious prosecution as follows:
(1) defendants initiated or procured the initiation of criminal proceedings
against an innocent plaintiff; (2) defendants did not have probable cause to
initiate the prosecution; (3) defendants initiated the proceedings primarily
for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; and (4) the
proceedings terminated in favor of the accused. See Kennedy v. Burbidge,
54 Utah 497, 500-01, 183 P. 325, 326 (Utah 1919); Callioux v. Progressive
Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct.App.1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 653 (1977); see also W. Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 871 (5th ed. 1984).
Id. at 156 (emphases added).
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2.

The Trial Court Grossly Misconstrued the Probable Cause Element

The trial court ruled that, because the criminal magistrate found probable cause in
the bindover setting, Branson's malicious prosecution claim was barred as a matter of
law. That ruling is incorrect, for several reasons.
First, the Utah Supreme Court's elucidation of elements of the tort of malicious
prosecution contradicts the trial court's ruling. Malicious prosecution plainly requires a
showing that the malicious prosecution defendant (the accuser in the criminal case) did
not have probable cause to initiate the criminal prosecution. Id. at 156 (requiring, among
other things, a showing that civil "defendant^ did not have probable cause to initiate the
prosecution" (emphases added)). The Utah Supreme Court reinforced this focus on the
civil defendant's belief and knowledge, stating:
An accusation leading to the initiation of a criminal prosecution
must be based on probable cause determined as of the time the action was
filed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 comment e (1977). The
accuser must have sufficient information based on an adequate
investigation to justify the conclusion that there is probable cause to initiate
a criminal proceeding. See Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11
Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960). The accuser must have a
reasonable basis for believing the accusation and must also subjectively
believe the accusation to be true. See Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208,
218, 241 P. 309, 312 (1925); McKenzie v. Canning, 42 Utah 529, 530-31,
131 P. 1172, 1172-73 (1913); Wright v. Ascheim, 5 Utah 480, 491, 17 P.
125,131(1888).
Id. at 158 (emphases added) (internal footnote omitted). Thus, the trial court
incorrectly shifted the subject of the probable cause inquiry from Marvin to the
criminal magistrate.
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Second, the criminal magistrate's bindover inquiry did not deal with the state of
mind of Marvin, but rather the evidence presented by the prosecution without evaluation
of credibility. Indeed the bindover is intentionally incredibly low. See, e.g., State v.
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 21, 137 P.3d 787 ("The bindover standard is intended to leave the
principal fact finding to the jury"); State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, % 9, 198 P.3d 471
("The bindover standard is intentionally low so that the credibility of witnesses and the
truthfulness of the facts are left to the fact-finder."). Thus, even if the bindover standard
is met, probable cause in the context of a civil malicious prosecution action is not
necessarily met because it is a different inquiry. Moreover, at her own initiative, the
prosecutor dismissed the charges against Branson. See R. 7151-58. Thus, the criminal
magistrate's bindover has no preclusive effect on Branson's malicious prosecution claim.
Third, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly rejected the trial court's ruling in Olson
v. Independent Order of Foresters, 324 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1958), opining that:
There can be no doubt that proof of fraud, perjury or other undue means in
procuring a magistrate to bind over a plaintiff in an action for malicious
prosecution would overcome any presumption of probable cause for such
binding over, but it does not follow that the absence of such evidence
makes the binding over by a magistrate conclusive evidence of probable
cause.
Id. at 1013 (emphases added). Thus, the trial court's logic would fail even if there was no
evidence of fraud, perjury, etc. by Marvin, but the conclusion is all the easier in the face
of the overwhelming evidence that Marvin lied to the criminal authorities. The trial court
was required to construe that evidence in Branson' favor, which it obviously did not.
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More recently, in Hodges, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a malicious
prosecution judgment in favor or the plaintiff, where the plaintiff had been "bound over
for a trial... [fjollowing a preliminary hearing," necessarily based on the magistrate's
finding of probable cause to believe that the criminal defendant / malicious-prosecution
plaintiff committed the alleged crime. Hodges v. Gibson, 811 P.2d at 155. Thus, the
criminal magistrate's bindover of the criminal matter is no impediment to Branson's
malicious prosecution claim.
Moreover, the relevant facts of Hodges resemble the facts of the instant case. The
plaintiff in Hodges was charged with a crime. See id. "Following a preliminary hearing,
[the plaintiff] was bound over for a t r i a l . . . . " Id. "Before [the plaintiff]'s trial could be
held," the prosecutor "dismissed the . . . charge against [the plaintiff]." Id. The plaintiff
in Hodges then filed a civil action against his accusers for malicious prosecution, among
other things. See id. The jury found the accusers "liable for malicious prosecution" and
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff. Id. The accusers
appealed. Id. Affirming the jury's malicious prosecution verdict against the accusers, the
Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected one of the civil defendant's arguments "that its
conduct was vindicated" by the filing of the criminal prosecution in the first instance. Id.
at 160.
Here, as in Hodges, Marvin called law enforcement and falsely accused Branson
of a crime. Despite his protestations of innocence, Branson was charged. Branson's
criminal matter was bound over, following a preliminary hearing. Also, prior to trial of
the criminal matter, the prosecutor dismissed the charge on her own motion. Thus, just as
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the Utah Supreme Court did in Hodges, this Court should reject the trial court's ruling
that Marvin's conduct was vindicated by the criminal bindover.
Finally, the trial court's ruling is illogical and, if accepted, would effectively
eliminate the tort of malicious prosecution, which has been recognized in Utah since
before it was a state. See, e.g., Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224, 226 (Utah Terr.
1893) (recognizing action for malicious prosecution).
Indeed, if the trial court's ruling were correct, then the more premeditated and
robust the lie supporting a false charge of criminal conduct, the more likely a false
accuser would escape liability for malicious prosecution. Because that well orchestrated,
yet false claim would be more likely to result in a bindover. Such cannot be the law.
3.

Sufficient Evidence Was in the Record to Survive Marvin's Motion
for Summary Judgment

The trial court also anchored its grant of summary judgment against Branson on
his malicious prosecution claim on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to
support the "malice" element his claim - "defendants initiated the proceedings primarily
for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." Id at 156. As with its
first basis for entry of partial summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution
claim, the trial court's second basis is incorrect.
Although only a single sworn statement would have been fatal to Marvin's
motion, when the trial court granted summary judgment, there was substantial evidence
in the record supporting the malice element. To wit, the following evidence was offered
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to support Branson's allegation that Marvin initiated the criminal matter primarily for a
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice:
The Events of January 26, 2005
•

Marvin signaled to Branson to pull over his automobile. See R.

3709, 7124, & 7944.
•

Marvin approached Branson's automobile and Marvin initiated a

verbal argument with Branson. See id.
•

While Branson was sitting in his automobile, seat belted in, Marvin

began punching Branson in the head and body, splitting Branson's ear and
causing Branson to bleed down his face and shoulder. See id.
•

Branson tried to escape Marvin's punches, but Marvin grabbed the

automobile's steering wheel and attempted to steer the automobile off the
road. See id.
•

When Marvin asked Branson to stop, Branson stopped his

automobile. See id.
•

After checking to make sure Marvin was not injured, Branson drove

home. See id.
•

After Branson left the scene to drive home, Carter observed Marvin

walking down the road uninjured. See R. 7946 & 11490.
•

To make himself appear injured for law enforcement, Marvin then

laid face down prone in the road near Mr. Carter's mailbox, got up, walked
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a short distance, then again laid face down prone in the road. Marvin then
got up walked to the side of the road and shuffled around in the gravel, and
then walked quickly back to his house. Again, he did not appear injured
and was not limping. See id.
•

The following day, Marvin pretended to be injured for law

enforcement. See id.
•

Based on Marvin's statements to the Sheriff, Branson was charged

with, among other crimes, aggravated assault and threat against life or
property. See R. 7151-58.
Marvin's Attempted Witness Tampering
•

The night before a hearing related to the above-described incident,

Marvin told Carter not to testify in Branson's defense. See R. 7949 &
11491. When Carter indicated that he would attend the hearing, Marvin
became agitated and threatened Carter. See id.
•

Carter perceived Marvin's statements as an attempt to intimidate him

so as to discourage Carter's testimony. See R. 7949 & 11492.
Marvin's Verbal Assault on Community Members
•

After the hearing, Marvin confronted a group of community

members who had appeared in support of Branson. See R. 7950 & 11492.
Marvin was highly agitated and calling them traitors. See id.
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Other Evidence of Marvin's Malice
•

Marvin procured the initiation of the criminal proceeding during the

pendency of this hard-fought and contentious civil case. See R. 7151-58.
•

Marvin refused to release the Farm and Branson's home, despite

Bowen's admonition that Marvin's conduct may be criminal, the parties'
agreement, and Branson's importuning. See R. 11486 at 113, 148-50, 17475, 177, 182-83, 185, 192-94, & 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64,
& 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 839-42.
•

Marvin attempted to terminate Branson's health insurance, while

Branson was in poor health. See R. 11486 at 169-71, 179-80, & 319; R.
11488 at 567.
Interpreting this evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable to Branson,
as this Court must, there was significant evidence in the record to support the malice
element of his malicious prosecution claim against Marvin. Thus, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Marvin on Branson's malicious prosecution
claim. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and remand Branson's malicious
prosecution claim for trial on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse the trial
court's grant of Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reverse the
trial court's denial of Branson's attorney fees specifically and expressly awarded by the
Jury, reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Branson's malicious
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prosecution claim, and remand to the trial court to award Branson his attorney fees and
hold a trial on the merits regarding Branson's malicious prosecution claim.
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